

incorporated, using the mounted crews for detail support. After both mounted and dismounted squads have attained proficiency in the basic skills, collective training events such as Bradley Table XII should be used to train the two elements together.

Key leaders (from platoon sergeants through battalion commanders) must spend equal time planning and observing dismounted and mounted training events. This not only allows them to provide and receive feedback on training but also emphasizes the two elements equally.

After the completion of such major training events as gunnery or rotations at the combat training centers, awards should be distributed equally to the

mounted and dismounted elements. This practice would further reinforce cohesion and the idea that, to be successful, each element should complement the other.

A plan should be implemented to rotate dismounted and mounted crews—not only to achieve cross-training but also to encourage the impression that personnel moves from the dismounted element to the mounted element are lateral, not upward.

Moving proficient soldiers out of high-visibility positions into less visible positions (especially proficient Bradley gunners) is often a difficult decision. But these measures will help develop a training program that produces a complementary, rather than competitive,

relationship. Only when the elements receive equal emphasis will Bradley mechanized infantry units be able to achieve the versatility required of modern dragoons.

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Moving Under Fire

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Soldiers who train at the National Training Center (NTC) often seem to be deficient in the techniques of moving under direct fire—better known as individual movement techniques (IMTs). This trend is especially evident in the infantrymen who dismount from Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs).

One reason for this deficiency, we believe, is that the techniques of moving under direct fire are rarely included in unit training exercises. The soldiers do not use the terrain to their advantage, do not coordinate individual movements, and do not maintain the momentum. As a result, units often lose the close-in battle. Once they are within small arms range of the opposing force (OPFOR), units of platoon, company, and battalion size become decisively engaged by OPFOR squads and platoons. The results are always the

same—an objective is not taken; a mission is not accomplished; and a battlefield is littered with casualties.

Army doctrine and history adequately address individual movement techniques, and infantry soldiers are taught the basics during their initial entry training. Infantry leaders learn the value of IMT through the various service schools. Every infantry-series manual except one teaches and reinforces this awareness: IMT is not included in the Skill Level 1 tasks in the infantry soldier's manual. The closest individual task to IMT is "Move as a Member of a Fire Team." This manual, therefore, does not help infantrymen reinforce IMT training.

On the basis of our experience during several rotations at the NTC, we believe that unit training should be based on a detailed assessment of each soldier's

IMT skills, and that individual marksmanship should be linked to movement techniques before the soldiers participate in collective task training.

Although many soldiers know at least something about how to conduct IMT, their squad leaders and platoon sergeants do not always insist that they do it right. Moving under direct fire is a skill that leaders often assume their soldiers have already mastered.

To draw a parallel, IMT is the equivalent of blocking and tackling in football. Every year, football coaches across the nation proclaim that they are "going back to the basics." They usually base this decision on their teams' poor performance—or an assessment of every player's performance. In most cases, each player receives a grade indicating how he has done. Fall and spring practices begin with the basics of

blocking and tackling; running and passing are out of the question until every individual on the team has mastered blocking and tackling.

The situation is the same with IMT. Each soldier's ability to conduct IMT must be assessed before he can move effectively as a member of a squad or conduct any collective fire and maneuver. ARTEP 7-8 MTP (Mission Training Plan), paragraph 1-5, states that individual tasks form the basic building blocks of training. Before progressing to collective training, a unit must first train individuals to the prescribed standards.

But how does an infantry leader go about assessing his soldiers' individual skills? The answer can be found in Chapter 5 of Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training. This manual provides a source of accepted and commonly used assessment tools for company commanders and other leaders down through squad level. The challenge for these leaders is to learn how to assess wartime mission essential tasks. The sources of evaluation data for organizational assessments shown in Figure 1 (taken from Figure 5-1 in the manual), will help a senior leader assess his organization's ability to accomplish wartime missions.

Leaders do not use all of these sources of assessment to the trainer's—and their soldiers'—advantage. As in football, they want to throw the ball (assess collective training) and see if they can score (meet the standards) before they take time to determine whether the players can block and tackle (move effectively under fire).

Unfortunately, there are many clear indicators of weaknesses in the available assessment tools. NTC take-home packages, for example, demonstrate that moving under direct fire has been reported as a training weakness for several years without much improvement. But are these take-home packages being used as assessment tools? Unit results on the Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB) Test and the Common Task Test (CTT) also indicate a high failure rate for this task. Low scores on the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) indicate a

training weakness when endurance is contrasted with individual movement techniques. Does a minimum score of 180 points mean that a soldier is able to move under fire? Even a simple pre-combat inspection of a dismounted infantryman who is about to conduct an offensive mission will give a leader some indication of that soldier's ability to move under fire. Experienced dismounted soldiers outfit themselves with knee and elbow pads, for example, and their load bearing equipment is tightly

fitted and always buckled.


Leaders must not ignore such indicators. They must build collective tasks upon individual tasks. They must know and develop their soldiers' IMT skills so the unit can seize the objective. If they don't, unlike football coaches who lose games, these leaders will squander valuable lives and fail to complete their missions.

IMT and individual marksmanship are integral parts of the AirLand Battle definition of combat power, which is "the ability of a unit to fight." This power is determined by maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. Supporting the elements of combat power requires a direct link between IMT and individual marksmanship.

With individual marksmanship, leaders can emphasize firepower and also focus on the other essentials of combat power. During marksmanship training, infantrymen should practice not only how to fire but also how to move and protect themselves under their commanders' leadership. This is training as they will fight. If soldiers are to be trained and ready for warfare, their peacetime training must replicate battlefield conditions as nearly as possible. Trainers must make sure their soldiers can cope with the complex, stressful, and lethal situations they will encounter in combat.

Destroying or capturing the enemy often means close combat, and in most cases dismounted infantry must move under direct fire. Soldiers must be able to make this connection between moving and shooting. We now expect them to come off a linear, predictable rifle range, exit from the back of their Bradley, and conduct actions on contact and on the objective.

Those who are responsible for training must find ways to bridge the gap between individual marksmanship and IMT. FM 23-9 places the responsibility for basic combat rifle marksmanship on units. Units are filling these basic requirements, but they should do more than that. We need a year-round cyclical training strategy that will hone our soldiers' advanced combat marksmanship skills. Bradley infantry trainers



need a point of reference that will describe how to get from FM 23-9 to Table XII of FM 23-1.

We need a manual that addresses the standards of infantry rifle marksmanship, perhaps patterned after the BFV gunnery tables. BFV dismounted infantry training would then mirror the format of the gunnery tables in FM 23-1 (perhaps in another manual or in a more detailed version of Chapter 8 in FM 23-1). There are two reasons for this: First, the ultimate goal of a BFV dismounted platoon is to perform battle drills in concert with the mounted force, which BFV Table XII describes to standard. Second, this approach would give a dismounted BFV infantryman a gunnery training mindset. Once he becomes familiar with the format of FM 23-1, the standardization would unite for him, in one reference, mounted and dismounted gunnery for the BFV platoon.

Formatting BFV dismounted gunnery into tables would also ensure that our dismounted infantrymen could effectively exercise the elements of combat power. Incorporating a table-based, gate-oriented training strategy would enable units to train—in sequence—individual soldiers, buddy teams, fire teams, squads, and platoons, just as FM 23-1 enables them to train crews, sections, and platoons.

This training strategy would make moving under direct fire a less perishable skill, because the dismounted force would then be required to meet a published standard of their whole continuum of training. Furthermore, the BFV trainer would have a more measurable standard to use as an assessment tool. This training strategy could also overcome other problems associated with BFV infantry, such as leader development. Squad manning would receive as much emphasis as crew manning. The investment of time and resources in our dismounted soldiers would not be so quickly spent in hasty decisions to man the turret. Noncommissioned officers would also have a more complete reference to use in meeting the dual responsibilities of their duties.

The dismounted infantry marksmanship tables that we propose are shown

COMBAT POWER TABLES (CPTs)	
TRAINING EVENT	TABLE
PRELIMINARY	
Dismounted Marksmanship Test	DMT
M16 Qualification	I
Advanced Marksmanship Techniques	II
IMT Land Navigation	III
Move Under Direct Fire Test	IV
BASIC	
Move Under Direct Fire Test	V A & B
Buddy Team BLUEFOR on Individual OPFOR	VI A & B
INTERMEDIATE	
BLUEFOR Fire Team on Two OPFOR	VII A & B
BLUEFOR Squad on Three OPFOR	VIII A & B
ADVANCED	
BLUEFOR Platoon on OPFOR Squad	IX A & B

Figure 2

in Figure 2. These combat power tables (CPTs) are not designed to replace the integrated training strategy described in Chapter 8 of FM 23-1, or to replace FM 7-7J, ARTEP 7-7J-Drill, and ARTEP 7-8-MTP. Rather, they are based upon the Infantry Soldier's Manual and FM 23-9. Units would be responsible for integrating the tables into the training strategy they use in leading up to their collective task training, but the format of the CPT would not be violated. A unit would therefore be free to create each CPT within the limits of the marksmanship and basic soldier skill manuals. Until an Army-wide standard could be published, scoring requirements would be met by a unit-designed training and evaluation outline (T&EO).

It is important to understand that CPTs are not situational training exercises (STXs). STXs are single-mission oriented, while CPTs would be skill oriented. The focus of the CPTs would be on finding out whether the individual, buddy team, fire team, squad, and platoon could move properly under direct fire while exercising the soldiers' marksmanship skills under unit leadership. The focus would not be on the link between individual and collective tasks. A unit would have to complete

all of these tables before training on MTP tasks, STXs, or field training exercises (FTXs). CPTs would therefore bridge the gap between shooting and moving before the unit conducted STXs or even battle drills, and would then become the foundation for the MTP collective tasks.

Preliminary CPTs would determine whether every soldier knew the M16 rifle—including all the leaders from platoon to fire team. The dismounted marksmanship test (DMT) measures the soldiers' ability to field strip every small arms weapon in the unit, and also their knowledge of the weapons' capabilities.

M16 qualification and advanced marksmanship techniques are hands-on performance tasks described in FM 23-9. A soldier will already have qualified with his assigned weapon, and advanced individual movement techniques can be performed with blank ammunition. IMT land navigation determines the soldiers' ability to identify low crawl, high crawl, and rushing terrain. (This is done from the prone position.) Finally, the soldier is required to perform the techniques of moving under direct fire with his assigned weapon. FM 23-1, Appendix

F, as well as the CTT manual, will provide the doctrinal standard that is missing from STP 7-11BCHM as a Skill Level 1 task.

In the proposed tables, basic through advanced CPTs incorporate an OPFOR with marksmanship. Table A uses MILES and blanks, BB guns, or paint ball guns. Table B uses dry fire techniques, then live rounds. The soldiers are outfitted with MILES gear for both tables for scoring and control purposes. They are given a minimum amount of time to choose their course of action from a certain vantage point; then they must negotiate the course. MILES zero would be required before execution. Soldiers would negotiate the basic through advanced CPTs with their assigned weapons. Thus, the squad automatic weapon, the Dragon, and the M203 would be incorporated.

Individuals would not be allowed to negotiate the next table until they had achieved a satisfactory score on a requisite table, as determined by the unit. Individual scores would be used to determine cumulative scores at buddy team and higher levels. The replication of battlefield effects would be kept to a minimum in order to stress IMT and marksmanship skills and remain focused on them.

The final outcome of CPTs would be a qualitative score for the various tables, not unlike the evaluation a foot-

ball player receives after a game. The trainer would then have an accurate assessment of the individual's IMT and marksmanship skills from buddy team through platoon. This score could be referenced much like the SQT score or a BFV crew Table VIII qualification score. Leaders would be evaluated on the basis of the amount of combat power that reached the objective.

Once the CPTs were complete, the trainer could be assured that he would progress into effective collective training. The result would be a smart, able, and aggressive dismounted infantryman who was integrated into his unit team.

The inability of dismounted soldiers to move under direct fire is a disturbing deficiency that must be corrected. This change must begin with the individual infantry soldier and his squad leader.

Squad leaders must be expected to know their soldiers' IMT skills in respect to their marksmanship ability. Including IMT skills as part of the train-the-trainer concept in the infantry Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course would help the squad leader do this. CPT would complete the battery of assessment tools the squad leader could use to judge and subsequently train his soldiers' offensive fighting skills.

Combat power tables would give company commanders and first sergeants the basic tool for training fire team and squad leaders on how to get

all their combat power on the objective. Battalion commanders and command sergeants major could use CPTs to ensure that the BFV platoons' dismounted and mounted elements could execute battle drills and collective tasks in concert. The speed and firepower of the BFV, therefore, would not overshadow the combat power the dismounted element contributes to the battlefield.

Finally, all trainers would endorse their superiors' confidence in the offensive skills of the dismount element by reminding them—through higher proficiency on collective tasks—that the dismounted soldier is an integral member of the combined arms team.

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Light Infantry Battalion Counterreconnaissance

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A successful defense is made up of reactive and offensive elements working together to deprive the enemy of the initiative. A defense that can destroy the coherence of the enemy's operations

can then ultimately defeat his uncoordinated forces.

Fundamental to a good defense are four key points: *preparation, disruption, concentration, and flexibility*. By

focusing on these points, a tactical commander can develop and execute a plan that disrupts the enemy's synchronization. He does this by defeating or misleading the enemy's reconnaissance